



With good identity criteria, we can make progress in a variety of  
philosophical debates. With a criterion for event identity, we can approach 
the question of  whether mental events are identical with or distinct from 
physical events, knowing what types of  features would render them 
identical or distinct. A diachronic identity criterion for persons can tell us 
whether you would survive a journey through a transporter machine that 
disassembles your atoms completely and then puts them back together 
again. And when considering entities at a single time, we want to know 
whether distinct objects can share the same qualitative properties: can two 
objects be alike in every respect except for the fact that there are two of  
them? A synchronic identity criterion for objects (a criterion for the 
identity of  objects at a time) would address this question. 
This chapter concerns the nature of  identity criteria and the relationship 
between ground and facts of  identity or distinctness. After some 
preliminaries in Section I, we turn to formulations of  identity criteria in 
terms of  ground in Section II. Section III explores reasons for and against 
taking identity and distinctness facts to be fundamental. Section IV tackles 
specific proposals for grounding identity and distinctness facts. 
I. Preliminaries 
Identity facts are ones like World War I = World War I, and distinctness 
facts are ones like The Louvre ¹ The Prado. Most identity facts discussed 
here take the form of  ‘x = y’ (where x and y are objects). Facts of  the 
form ‘~ x = y’ (often written as x ¹ y) counts as a distinctness fact for our 
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purposes. In what follows, I discuss proposals for grounding both identity 
and distinctness facts. It is controversial whether we should always group 
identity and distinctness facts together: we may take certain distinctness 
facts to be grounded while taking identity facts to be ungrounded (or vice 
versa). Or we may take both identity and distinctness facts to be grounded 
but in radically different ways. I will highlight points where a separate 
treatment of  identity and distinctness facts may be desirable. 
I make a series of  assumptions that, while not necessary, help streamline 
the discussion. I employ a fact-based account of  ground where ground is 
taken to be a relation holding among facts. I also assume the grounding 
relation is transitive, asymmetric and (hence) irreflexive and that ground is 
factive (see Thompson’s contribution to this volume for further 
discussion). 
I primarily discuss two varieties of  identity and distinctness facts. 
1. General (or Quantificational) identity and distinctness facts: These involve 
quantification over entities. Examples include, (∀x)(x = x), (∃x)(x = 
Angela Merkel), and (∃x)(∃y)(x ¹ y). 
And 
2. Individual identity and distinctness facts: These concern the identity or 
distinctness of  individual entities (they can be objects, properties, 
relations, etc.). Examples include, Angela Merkel = Angela Merkel, and 
Angela Merkel ¹ Emmanuel Macron. 
II. Identity Criteria and Ground 
We often provide identity criteria in terms of  necessary and sufficient 
conditions: x = y if  and only if  condition P obtains. Following Kit 
Fi(2016), we call identity criteria of  this form “material criteria”.1 Fine 
(2016) formulates identity criteria in terms of  ground as well: if  x = y, then 
some fact P grounds x = y. We call identity criteria of  this form, 
“grounding criteria”. An example will help us see the difference between 
material and grounding criteria. Let’s consider a material criterion for set 
identity. For sets x and y: 
Set-Identitymat: x = y iff  (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) 
In other words, set x is identical with set y if  and only if x and y have exactly 
the same members. We can also formulate a grounding criterion for set-
identity: 
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Set-Identityg: if  x = y, then x = y is fully grounded in the fact: (∀z)(z ∈ 
x ≡ z ∈ y). 
Fine (2016) maintains that we should seek grounding criteria if  we want to 
pinpoint in virtue of what entities are identical or distinct. Since in virtue of is 
plausibly an asymmetric notion, material criteria cannot tell us in virtue of  
what objects are identical or distinct. Material criteria do not establish any 
direction of  dependence. Set-Identitymat merely tells us that if  (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ 
z ∈ y) obtains then x = y, and if  x = y, then (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) obtains. 
Alternatively, since ground strives to capture a metaphysical notion of  in 
virtue of, it is better suited for capturing asymmetric dependence. If  ground 
is an asymmetric relation, Set-Identityg tells us that if  x = y, (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) grounds x = y, in which case x = y does not ground (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ 
y). 
Given that the grounding theorist typically thinks that if  P grounds Q then 
P metaphysically explains Q (see Glazier’s contribution to this volume 
[Chapter 8] for discussion of  the connection between ground and 
metaphysical explanation), grounding criteria will be attractive to those 
who want a metaphysical explanation of  why entities are identical or 
distinct. We often seek a metaphysical explanation when tackling puzzling 
cases about identity. For instance, when encountering the thought 
experiment in which Man A enters a transporter and two psychological and 
physical duplicates of  him, Man B and Man C, emerge, we want to explain 
in virtue of  what Man A is identical with or distinct from Man B. To be 
fair, first we want to know whether Man A is identical with or distinct from 
Man B, and similarly for the relation between Man A and Man C. But to 
support our verdict, we want to know why Man A is identical with or 
distinct from Man B. We want a metaphysical explanation of  this identity 
or distinctness fact. Thus, a grounding criterion of  personal identity would 
be valuable for us if  we could find one. 
Let’s turn to the relationship between grounding and material criteria: 
material criteria do not entail grounding criteria as we have seen, but do 
grounding criteria entail material criteria? It depends on how we formulate 
grounding criteria. Set-Identityg will establish that if  x = y then (∀z)(z ∈ x 
≡ z ∈ y), which is the necessity condition of  Set-Identitymat (the necessity 
condition follows from other principles as well, like Leibniz’s Principle of  
the Indiscernibility of  Identicals). Since Set-Identityg states that if  x = y, 
then (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) grounds x = y, it follows that (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) 
obtains if  x = y does. What about sufficiency? If  (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y), then 
will x = y hold? The formulation of  Set-Identityg does not yield this result 
automatically. The criterion does not rule out that (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) 
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obtains yet x is distinct from y. Set-Identityg says only that if x = y, then 
(∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) grounds x = y. While we antecedently believe it is 
metaphysically impossible for distinct sets to share all their members, the 
formulation of  Set-Identityg itself  does not prohibit this. 
However, we can construct a grounding criterion that would explicitly 
entail the sufficiency condition of  the material criterion. One way of  doing 
so is as follows. For sets x and y: 
Set-Identityg2: 
(1) If  x = y, then x = y is fully grounded in the fact (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ 
y). 
And 
(2) If  x ¹ y, then x ¹ y is fully grounded in the fact ~(∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ 
y). 
If  x ¹ y, then x ¹ y is fully grounded in ~ (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y). So ~ (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) obtains if  x ¹ y does. By contraposition and double negation 
elimination, if  (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y) then x = y. The sufficiency condition of  
Set-Identitymat is thereby established. 
We have now examined differences between grounding criteria and 
material criteria. Grounding criteria capture a direction of  dependence, 
they back metaphysical explanations, and certain formulations of  
grounding criteria are strong enough to entail corresponding material 
criteria. If  we want identity criteria to back metaphysical explanations while 
generating both necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of  the 
entities in question, formulations of  identity criteria with the form of  Set-
Identityg2 will be preferable over formulations like Set-Identityg and Set-
Identitymat. 
There are still other varieties of  grounding identity criteria to consider. 
Fine (2016) discusses two. First, a grounding identity criterion may tell us, 
for any objects x and y, in virtue of  what they are identical. Fine calls this a 
“general” criterion and describes it thusly: “[the general criterion] tells us, 
for any two particular objects of  the sort in question, what makes them the 
same” (Fine 2016: 4). We can clarify the form of  general criteria using 
universal quantifiers as follows: 
Set-Identityg-general: (∀x)(∀y)[Set(x) & Set(y) & x = y ⊃ (x = y is fully 
grounded in (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y))] 
A second alternative is to formulate identity criteria in terms of  arbitrary 
objects. Following Fine, we call this a “generic” criterion. Instead of  
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stating that for any sets x and y, if  x = y then x = y is grounded in (∀z)(z ∈ 
x ≡ z ∈ y), we claim that for the arbitrary sets x and y, if  x = y then that fact 
is grounded in (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y). The generic criterion for sets would 
then answer the question: “in virtue of  what are these two sets the same, 
i.e., what is it about the two arbitrary sets (considered as representative 
individual sets, not as objects in their own right) that would make them the 
same?” (Fine 2016: 13). 
Set-Identityg-generic: For arbitrary sets x and y, if  x = y then then x = y is 
fully grounded in the fact: (∀z)(z ∈ x ≡ z ∈ y). 
Fine favors generic criteria over general criteria.2 General criteria 
demonstrate how to ground individual identity and distinctness facts, the 
instances of  the universal generalization. Fine thinks the question of  what 
grounds the fact that individual sets are identical with themselves is just a 
“pseudo-problem—one that we cannot take seriously as answering to any 
real issue about the identity of  sets” (Fine 2016: 12). When providing a 
metaphysical explanation of  set-identity, we do not care about explaining 
in virtue of  what is it the case that {Socrates} is identical with {Socrates}. 
We do not care about {Socrates} in particular. Instead, we want a generic 
criterion that will tell us in virtue of  what any two arbitrary sets are 
identical. For further discussion of  generic identity criteria and its appeal, 
see Fine (2016), and for further discussion of  arbitrary objects, see Fine 
(1985). 
II. When (if  Ever) Are Identity or Distinctness Facts 
Fundamental? 
Is it truly just a pseudo-problem to consider in virtue of  what {Socrates} 
is identical with itself ? If  such facts do not hold in virtue of  other facts, 
are we pressured to take them to be fundamental? In this section, we turn 
to identity and distinctness facts that do not involve arbitrary objects. We 
will examine three sources of  motivation for taking at least some identity 
and distinctness facts of  this form to be fundamental. 
One may take the identity or distinctness of  objects to serve as a 
“precondition” of  their standing in other kinds of  relations to each other. 
The distinctness of  The Louvre and The Prado, for example, is a 
precondition for their being spatially separated from one another. Fiocco 
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(forthcoming) articulates an idea in this vicinity, and he maintains that the 
“individuation of  a thing is inexplicable” (although it is not clear that 
Fiocco himself  would conclude from this that identity and distinctness 
facts are metaphysically fundamental). 
We need to better understand what it is for one fact to be a “precondition” 
of  another to see whether this inclines us to take identity and distinctness 
facts to be metaphysically ungrounded. One option is to characterize 
preconditions modally: a fact Ф is a precondition of  another fact Ψ when 
Ф is a necessary condition of  Ψ. On this characterization, Ф may still be 
metaphysically grounded—and even metaphysically grounded in Ψ. The 
conjunctive fact, 2 + 2 = 4 & 3 + 3 = 6, is a modal precondition of  2 + 2 
= 4: It is necessary that the former obtains in order for the latter to obtain. 
Nevertheless, 2 + 2 = 4 grounds the conjunctive fact. Thus, it cannot be 
identity and distinctness facts serving as modal preconditions for other 
facts that establishes that identity and distinctness facts are metaphysically 
ungrounded. 
The lesson may be that we cannot think of  preconditions purely modally. 
We can import a notion of  ground, essence, or real definition into our 
characterization of  a precondition to see if  that will help. I will appeal to 
ground. Let’s assess whether identity and distinctness facts serve as 
‘grounding preconditions’ for other facts—where a fact Ф is a grounding 
precondition of  fact Ψ iff  whenever Ψ obtains, Ф partially grounds Ψ. 
Perhaps the fact that objects x and y are distinct serves as a grounding 
precondition for x and y’s standing in other relations. For example, the fact 
that a is distinct from b may be a grounding precondition of  the fact that a 
is more massive than b. 
This is one point at which we may wish to treat identity and distinctness 
facts separately: Perhaps only distinctness facts serve as grounding 
preconditions in this way. It is odd, for example, to claim that a = a is a 
grounding precondition of  the fact that a is as massive as a, especially since 
distinct objects can be as massive as each other. Nevertheless, I will 
continue to package identity and distinctness facts together for ease of  
exposition. 
Even if  identity and distinctness facts are grounding preconditions for 
objects standing in polyadic relations, this does not establish that they are 
ungrounded. Identity and distinctness facts may still be grounded in 
objects’ instantiating certain monadic properties. In response, we can 
broaden the proposal: maybe identity and distinctness facts are grounding 
preconditions for objects instantiating any properties/standing in any 
relations whatsoever (other than the identity and distinctness relations 
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themselves). Identity and distinctness facts may then be ungrounded: we 
are running out of  facts to potentially ground them! 
However, this suggestion leads to our treating many intuitively 
metaphysically fundamental facts as nonfundamental; such facts will have 
identity/distinctness facts as grounding preconditions. For instance, if  e = 
e (where e is an electron) is a grounding precondition of  e’s having -1 
charge, then we cannot claim that the fact that e has -1 charge is 
ungrounded. It is also not clear what the full grounds of  e has -1 charge 
would be if  e = e serves as a partial (but not full) ground of  that fact. This 
issue arises for every fact involving objects instantiating intuitively 
fundamental physical properties/relations. 
A second motivation for taking certain identity and distinctness facts to be 
fundamental arises if  you think that identity is “joint-carving.” Theodore 
Sider (2011) takes certain quantificational identity and distinctness facts or 
truths to be fundamental; although he does not understand fundamentality 
in terms of  ground (see Tahko’s “Structure” in this volume [Chapter 27] 
for more on Sider’s notion of  fundamentality and joint-carvingness). Sider 
treats the following notions as joint-carving: “first-order quantification 
theory (with identity), plus a predicate symbol ∈ for set-membership, plus 
predicates adequate for fundamental physics, plus the notion of  structure” 
(2011: 292–293). Sider characterizes facts as fundamental when they 
involve purely joint-carving notions. Fundamental facts will include ones 
like (∃x)Rx, (∃x)(Rx ν Lx), etc. where R and L are joint-carving predicates, 
and ∃ is a joint-carving existential quantifier. Since the identity predicate 
appears to be joint-carving, identity and distinctness facts like (∃x)(∃y)(x = 
y), (∃x)(∃y)(x ¹ y) and (∃x)(∃y)((Px & Qy) & (x ¹ y)) will count as 
fundamental if  P and Q are joint-carving predicates and ∃ is a joint-
carving existential quantifier. 
Does the grounding theorist also have this basis for treating these identity 
facts as fundamental? Grounding theorists typically ground logically 
complex facts in their simpler components. For instance, grounding 
theorists do not commonly take disjunctions, conjunctions, or existential 
generalizations to be fundamental. Conjunctions and disjunctions are 
grounded in their conjuncts and disjuncts, respectively. Existential 
generalizations are commonly grounded in their instances (see 
McSweeney’s [Chapter 32] and Poggiolesi’s [Chapter 14] entries in this 
volume for further discussion). Sider’s rationale for treating certain identity 
and distinctness facts as fundamental carries does not straightforwardly 
carry over into a grounding context. The identity and distinctness facts 
Sider treats as fundamental, such as (∃x)(∃y)(x ¹ y) and (∃x)(∃y)(x = y), 
will be nonfundamental for the grounding theorist who claims these facts 
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are grounded in their instances, a ¹ b and a = a, respectively. Thus, even if  
facts contain only joint-carving notions in Sider’s sense, the grounding 
theorist may still ground them. 
Of  course, the grounding theorist can reject that quantificational facts are 
grounded in their instances, in which case she may be more sympathetic to 
Sider’s view.3 But if  the grounding theorist is not willing to go this route, 
the question becomes: do we have good reasons to treat individual identity 
and distinctness facts, like a ¹ b and a = a—the ones which ground 
(∃x)(∃y)(x ¹ y) and (∃x)(∃y)(x = y)—as fundamental? 
There are different options here. A grounding theorist sympathetic with 
Sider’s perspective may maintain that identity and distinctness facts 
involving intuitively nonfundamental objects are nonfundamental but ones 
involving intuitively fundamental objects are fundamental. This would be a 
mixed view upon which some individual identity and distinctness facts are 
grounded and others are ungrounded. We may like such a view if  we think 
there should be no fundamental facts involving nonfundamental objects, 
but we have no problem with taking identity and distinctness facts 
involving only fundamental objects to be fundamental. A second option 
would be to take all individual identity and distinctness facts to be 
fundamental, and a third option would be to take them all to be grounded. 
We will explore this third option in the next section. 
A third reason to posit at least some fundamental distinctness facts ( this 
reasoning does not necessarily extend to identity facts) is to account for 
certain kinds of  metaphysical possibilities. For example, we will consider a 
scenario popularized by Max Black (1952), the “sphere world”. The sphere 
world contains two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux, in an 
otherwise empty universe. It is difficult to determine on what basis Castor 
and Pollux are distinct. They are both silver, they both have a mass of  5 kg, 
they are 10 meters from each other, and so on. 
If  we take distinctness facts to be fundamental, we can sidestep the 
question of  what makes Castor distinct from Pollux. They just are distinct; 
it is a brute fact. We can posit a fundamental distinctness fact in the sphere 
world to accommodate this. Shamik Dasgupta (2009) recommends this 
approach. The fundamental distinctness fact in the sphere world could take 
the following form: 
(∃x) (∃y)((Px & Py) & x ¹ y) 
where P is a predicate that picks out the full qualitative profile of  each of  
the spheres. The fan of  individual identity and distinctness facts could also 
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adapt his proposal and posit a fundamental distinctness fact of  the form: 
Castor ¹ Pollux. 
The attractiveness of  taking facts like Castor ¹ Pollux to be fundamental 
hinges on the idea that we have no basis upon which to distinguish the 
spheres in Max Black’s famous scenario. It also relies upon the idea that we 
do not always need grounding criteria of  identity: We do not need 
grounding criteria for the distinctness of  material objects like spheres on 
this proposal. In the next section, we consider opposing proposals. We will 
investigate grounding criteria that attempt to distinguish Castor and Pollux. 
IV. Proposals for Grounding Identity and Distinctness Facts 
We have looked at three sources of  motivation for treating at least some 
identity and distinctness as fundamental as well as issues potentially 
undermining these motivations. Now we will consider four options for 
taking identity and distinctness facts to be grounded. I focus on grounding 
criteria for object identity and distinctness, as this has been the most 
discussed in the literature. Burgess (2012), Donaldson (2017), and Fine 
(2012) all discuss proposals for grounding individual identity facts 
involving objects. It is a substantive question which (if  any) of  these 
grounding proposals can be extended to accommodate the identity of  
entities in other ontological categories (such as properties, relations, facts, 
etc.). 
While I discuss grounding identity and distinctness facts involving objects 
in general, we may only try to ground certain identity and distinctness facts 
involving objects. For instance, as mentioned, we may take identity and 
distinctness facts involving nonfundamental objects to be grounded and 
ones involving only fundamental objects to be ungrounded. If  one believes 
that only identity and distinctness facts involving certain objects (say, the 
nonfundamental objects) should be grounded, then grounding criteria like 
those that follow will not be desirable. 
One way to ground identity and distinctness facts is by appealing to the 
properties objects share. More specifically, we can appeal to one half  of  
Leibniz’s Law, the Principle of  the Identity of  Indiscernibles, in order to 
offer a metaphysical explanation of  identity and distinctness facts (see 
Della Rocca (2005)). While this proposal has trouble accommodating the 
sphere world from the previous section, it will be worthwhile to examine it 
more closely to see why it is problematic. 
The Properties Proposal: 
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(1) If  x = y, then x = y is fully grounded in the fact that (∀F)(Fx ≡ Fy). 
And, 
(2) If  x ¹ y, x ¹ y is fully grounded in the fact (∃F)(Fx & ~Fy) ν (∃F)(~Fx 
& Fy) ∀F ranges over properties. We should restrict the class of  properties to 
qualitative ones—properties that do not involve the identities of  individual 
objects. If  we invoke facts involving nonqualitative properties (properties 
like is identical with b or is distinct from a) to ground individual identity and 
distinctness facts, we could ground the fact that a ¹ b in the fact that b has 
the monadic property is identical with b while a does not have that property. 
This would render the account trivial. We will also violate irreflexivity if  
the fact that b has the monadic property is identical with b is grounded in b’s 
standing in the binary identity relation to b. 
While we can just restrict the class of  properties to ‘qualitative’ ones that 
do not involve the identities of  particular objects, this is problematic: The 
resulting proposal cannot accommodate the metaphysical possibility of  
distinct yet qualitatively identical objects in an otherwise empty world, i.e., 
the sphere world discussed in the previous section. We lack the grounds 
for the distinctness of  the two qualitatively identical spheres. In fact, since 
(∀F)(F(Castor) ≡ F(Pollux)) obtains, the grounds for Castor = Pollux 
obtains. And if  we accept a grounding necessitation principle (see Skiles’s 
entry [Chapter 10]), this should establish that Castor = Pollux, which 
conflicts with the set-up of  the scenario. 
A second proposal appeals to facts about the existence of  objects in order 
to ground identity and distinctness facts. Burgess (2012: 90) suggests that 
identity facts at first “seem to be nothing over and above the relevant 
existential facts.” Epstein (2015: 169–181) expresses sympathy for this 
proposal. Perhaps we can ground identity and distinctness facts in the 
existence of  objects. 
The Existence Proposal: 
(1) If  x = y, then x = y is fully grounded in the fact x exists. 
And 
(2) If  x ¹ y, x ¹ y is fully grounded in the plurality of  facts: x exists, y 
exists. 
One advantage of  the Existence Proposal over the Properties Proposal is 
that the former accounts for the distinctness of  the Max Black spheres. In 
the possible world where only Castor and Pollux exist, Castor ¹ Pollux is 
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grounded in the two facts: Castor exists, Pollux exists. Castor = Castor is 
grounded in the single fact, Castor exists. 
Burgess (2012) explores a version of  the Existence Proposal and points 
out a troubling feature. If  the fact that Castor exists has the logical form 
(∃x)(x = Castor) then Castor = Castor is fully grounded in the fact that 
(∃x)(x = Castor). And if  existentially quantified facts are grounded in their 
instances, (∃x)(x = Castor) is grounded in Castor = Castor, yielding a 
violation of  irreflexivity. 
The proponent of  the Existence Proposal can avoid this result in a few 
ways: (1) They can deny the transitivity or irreflexivity of  ground (See 
Thompson’s “Partial Order” for discussion), (2) they can deny that 
existential generalizations are grounded in their instances (see chapters in 
this volume by McSweeney [Chapter 32], Poggiolesi [Chapter 14], and 
Krämer [Chapter 18] for discussion of  options in line with 2), or (3) they 
can deny that existence facts are always existential generalizations. 
I will set aside options 1 and 2 and explore option 3. Instead of  treating 
existence quantificationally, we can understand existence as a monadic 
property of  objects. In this case, Castor exists will have the form of  an 
atomic fact, E(Castor). As we have no reason to think E(Castor) will be 
grounded in the fact that Castor = Castor, we can avoid a potential 
violation of  circularity by claiming that identity facts like Castor = Castor 
are grounded in facts like E(Castor). 
The advocate of  this alternative should say more about the grounds of  
facts like E(Castor). After all, if  E(Castor) is at least partially grounded in 
(∃x)(x = Castor) we will face the same circularity. If  E(Castor) is not 
grounded in this way, we should explain how existential-property facts and 
existential generalizations relate to one another (see Fine (2012) for 
discussion). 
The Existence Proposal faces another issue: it cannot accommodate 
identity and distinctness facts (if  there are any) involving nonexistent 
entities. You may think that Santa Claus is identical with Santa Claus even 
though Santa Claus does not exist. If  left unrestricted, the Existence 
Proposal predicts that if  ‘Santa Claus = Santa Claus’ picks out a genuine 
identity fact, the ground of  Santa Claus = Santa Claus is the existence of  
Santa Claus. But Santa Claus does not exist. 
The proponent of  the Existence Proposal should presumably deny that 
there are identity facts involving nonexistent objects. The plausibility of  
this may depend upon whether one has a fact-based or sentential operator-
based account of  ground. We can deny that Santa Claus = Santa Claus 
picks out a genuine identity fact on a fact-based account of  ground, 
especially if  we take facts of  the form a = a to involve objects instantiating 
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properties/relations. We would presumably deny that Santa Claus = Santa 
Claus picks out a genuine fact on this view because there is no object to 
stand in the identity relation. However, if  we have a sentential-operator 
account of  ground, we may want to uphold that ‘Santa Claus = Santa 
Claus’ is a true sentence (even if  it does not correspond to a worldly fact). 
Thus, it is not clear what a proponent of  the Existence Proposal who 
subscribes to the sentential-operator approach should say about the 
grounds of  ‘Santa Claus = Santa Claus’. 
A third alternative is to ground identity and distinctness facts in facts 
concerning parthood (see Burgess 20124). Perhaps x is identical with y 
when x is part of  y and y is part of  x. This approach requires us to take the 
notion of  part to be more fundamental than that of  identity. Here is one 
way to formulate the parthood proposal, where the predicate P picks out 
the relation is part of. 
The Parthood Proposal: 
(1) If  x = y, x = y is fully grounded in the plurality of  facts: Pxy, Pyx. 
And 
(2) If  x ¹ y then x ¹ y is fully grounded in the fact ~ Pxy, or x ¹ y is 
grounded in the fact ~Pyx. 
When x is part of  y and y is part of  x, then x is what is often called an 
‘improper part’ of  y. One common way to understand the improper parthood 
relation is in terms of  identity: x is an improper part of  y iff  x is identical 
to y. We contrast the improper parthood relation with the more intuitive proper 
parthood relation, where x stands in the proper parthood relation to z when 
x is part of  z and x is not identical to z. To avoid circularity, it is important 
that we do not define P in terms of  improper parthood and then define 
improper parthood in terms of  identity. For example, we cannot think of  P 
as picking out the relation is an improper part of or the disjunctive relation, is 
either a proper part of  or an improper part of, and then go on to define improper 
parthood in terms of  being identical with. Instead, the proponent of  the 
Parthood Proposal would more likely leave the is part of relation undefined 
or primitive.5 
This proposal can distinguish everyday objects we encounter: the Coca-
Cola bottle is distinct from the cheeseburger because neither is part of  the 
other. They do not even share any parts in common. And the fact that the 
cheeseburger is an improper part of  itself  will ground the fact the 
cheeseburger is identical with itself. While the bottle and the cheeseburger 
are intuitively mereological fusions made up of  proper parts, the Parthood 
Proposal is supposed to work for mereological atoms as well. While 
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mereological atoms have no proper parts, they have themselves as 
improper parts. This proposal can also distinguish Castor and Pollux in the 
sphere world: Castor is not a proper or improper part of  Pollux, nor is 
Pollux a proper or improper part of  Castor. 
The Parthood Proposal is not for everyone. Sider resists defining identity 
in terms of  parthood. While he does not discuss ground, his concerns may 
carry over into a discussion of  grounding criteria. Sider states: 
[C]onsider the objection that adopting parthood in fundamental theories 
allows the elimination of identity from ideology via the definition ‘x = y 
=df x is part of y and y is part of x’. The savings in ideological parsimony 
would be outweighed by increased complexity in the laws, which I take 
to include laws of logic and metaphysics. The logical laws governing ‘=’ 
must now be rewritten in terms of the proposed definition, making them 
more complex; and further, the laws of mereology will be needed. 
(Sider 2013: fn. 10) 
Sider thinks if  we understand identity in terms of  parthood, we must 
rewrite the logical laws in terms of  mereological notions, and this revision 
will be much more complex than the versions we have involving identity. 
This added complexity is problematic if  we favor simpler theories. 
The Parthood Proposal will also face resistance from some (but not all) 
mereological nihilists. 
The mereological nihilist denies that objects have proper parts. Under one 
version of  mereological nihilism, only mereological atoms exist, and they 
are improper parts of  themselves. This view appears to be compatible with 
the Parthood Proposal: every atom is an improper part of  itself  and not a 
part of  any distinct atoms. Other versions of  mereological nihilism cannot 
accept the Parthood Proposal. Consider a version of  mereological nihilism 
that denies the existence of  parthood relations from the outset. This 
mereological nihilist will also claim that the only objects that exist, 
fundamentally speaking, are mereological atoms; yet they will deny that the 
atoms are parts of  themselves because they deny that anything stands in 
the parthood relation. The proponent of  this version of  mereological 
nihilism cannot use The Parthood Proposal to generate the correct verdicts 
about identity and distinctness. Finally, the Parthood Proposal may be too 
limited in scope if  we are seeking a general account of  object-identity. 
Insofar as there are objects that do not stand in any parthood relations—
such as abstract objects, like numbers—the Parthood Proposal cannot 
ground identity and distinctness facts concerning them.6 
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The fourth and final proposal we will consider is whether identity and 
distinctness facts are zero-grounded. A fact is zero-grounded when it is not 
grounded in further facts, but it is not ungrounded either. Fine describes 
the distinction between being ungrounded and being zero-grounded: 
There is a . . . distinction to be drawn between being zero-grounded and 
ungrounded. In the one case, the truth in question simply disappears 
from the world, so to speak. What generates it . . . is its zero-ground. But 
in the case of an ungrounded truth . . . the truth is not even generated. 
(Fine (2012): 48) 
Fine then considers taking identity facts to be zero-grounded: 
But in other cases—as with Socrates being identical to Socrates or with 
Socrates belonging to singleton Socrates—it is not so clear what the 
contingent truths might be; and a plausible alternative is to suppose that 
they are somehow grounded in nothing at all. 
(Fine (2012): 48) 
Tom Donaldson (2017) explores taking certain mathematical identity facts 
to be zero-grounded as well. We can formulate a version of  the Zero-
Ground Proposal as follows: 
The Zero-Ground Proposal1: 
(1) If  x = y, then x = y is zero-grounded. 
Identity facts are grounded on this proposal even though there are no facts 
that ground them. The distinction between being ungrounded and being 
zero-grounded is significant because were we to take identity facts to be 
ungrounded, we would be pressured to treat them as fundamental. Since 
the Zero-Ground Proposal1 maintains that identity facts are grounded, they 
are nonfundamental. 
This is another point in which our treatment of  identity and distinctness 
facts may come apart: it is not clear that distinctness facts should be zero-
grounded as well. While Fine and Donaldson are primarily concerned with 
grounding identity facts, we could try to extend the Zero-Ground 
Proposal1 to accommodate distinctness facts as follows. 
The Zero-Ground Proposal2: 
(1) If  x = y, then x = y is zero-grounded. 
(2) If  x ¹ y, then x ¹ y is zero-grounded. 
29 Identity 
With the added clause for distinctness, the Zero-Ground Proposal2 can 
accommodate the sphere world. Castor ¹ Pollux is zero-grounded. Unlike 
the other proposals, the Zero-Ground Proposal2 maintains that identity 
facts and distinctness facts have the same grounds. Castor = Castor and 
Pollux = Pollux are also zero-grounded. This is not necessarily 
problematic, but it is not yet clear that this proposal yields a satisfactory 
metaphysical explanation of  why objects are distinct. If  we are looking for 
a basis upon which to distinguish objects like Castor and Pollux, then I am 
not sure the Zero-Grounding Proposal2 provides it. The distinctness of  
Castor and Pollux is metaphysically explained on the Zero-Grounding 
Proposal2—but not on the basis of  any facts. 
This proposal maintains that distinctness facts are grounded in the same 
way identity facts are grounded: they have the null ground. Perhaps 
different kinds of  facts should admit of  different grounds. For example, 
Dasgupta (2014) objects to grounding facts in their grounds because it 
would render ‘P grounds P ν P’ as grounded in the same way as ‘P grounds 
P & P’. (Both would be grounded in P). He thinks there should be a 
difference in the grounds of  ‘P grounds P ν P’ and ‘P grounds P & P’: the 
former fact concerns disjunction whereas the latter concerns conjunction. 
The grounds should reflect this difference, so the thought goes. Likewise, 
we may object to the Zero-Ground Proposal2 because it is implausible that 
identity and distinctness facts would have exactly the same grounds. It is 
strange for facts of  the form x = y and of  the form ~ x = y to have 
exactly the same grounds. 
All of  these proposals for grounding identity and distinctness facts have 
issues in need of  further examination. There is a lot of  philosophical room 
left to explore when questioning whether and how to ground identity and 
distinctness facts. The aim in this chapter is not to advocate formulating 
identity criteria in terms of  ground, nor is it to convince the reader that 
identity and distinctness facts must be grounded. Instead, I hope to have 
provided an array of  options open for investigation and that the reader has 
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1 We also often witness a modal analogue of material criteria:  [x = y if and only if condition P 
obtains]. We will only discuss nonmodal material criteria in what follows. 
2 As a presentational note: I have not taken a stand as to whether Set-Identityg Set-Identityg2, and 
Set-Identitymat should be understood generally or generically, and I leave further formulations 
of grounding criteria similarly ambiguous. 
3 See Rosen (2010) for discussion of reasons to take certain universal generalizations as 
fundamental. 
4 See Smid (2017) as well; although he is not concerned with ground in his paper. 
5 We should note that if we adopt extensional mereology with a strong supplementation principle, 
we cannot have distinct objects with the same proper parts on this view. 
6 However, some philosophers argue that entities other than concrete objects stand in parthood 
relations. See Paul (2010)) and Fine (2010). 
